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    • Therefore this section showed that

    2018-11-15

    Therefore, this section showed that, because of the obscure regulation of the antidumping practice, this mechanism has become one of the main instruments of protection of our day. Although the Uruguay Round had discussed this problem, it was not able to reduce the use of AD measures. Actually, several countries which were considered non-traditional in the use of this resource began to use it more intensely at the end of this meeting. As mentioned in this section, this phenomenon could be connected to the retaliation and the contagion effect. Furthermore, the increase in the number of AD cases during this Pirfenidone Supplier led some authors to suggest that this instrument has being used as an entry barrier in order to avoid new competitors and favor companies that are already competitive. Hence, given the current utilization of the AD instrument, some issues arise: (1) which countries contributed more to the increase/decrease of the number of AD cases after the Uruguay Round? (2) Which of them became the main targets of these measures? (3) Could the AD use by a country be influenced by its neighbors (contagion effect)? (4) Are these countries converging in terms of the use of this instrument? (5) How could they be grouped in terms of the AD use? (6) Are the more competitive sectors being privileged? These are some issues that the methods introduced in the next section seek to clarify.
    Methodology and database
    Empirical results The results coming from Eq. (1) reveal that there was a general downward trend in the opening of AD cases between 1995 and 2012 (Table 1). As mentioned by Bown (2011), this reduction in the use of AD could be explained by the end of 2001–2002 recession and the further liberalization carried out by WTO members after 2001 under the ideas of Doha Round. Considering all members of WTO, denominated “world” in Table 1, we see that an average of 296 cases was initiated per year. Furthermore, we detected a decreasing trend of approximately 7 cases p.a., which represents a yearly decrease of almost 2.4% per year. India, European Union and USA were the main responsible for the verified reduction during this period. Together, they contributed to reduce around 4.6 AD measures p.a., which represents more than 65% of the total trend associated to AD cases. Individually, Venezuela seems to have made the most effort in order to reduce the AD. The country showed a reduction of more than 7% per year. However, its participation in the total cases is too timid (barely 0.75%) to influence the global trend in a significant way. On the other hand, Brazil appears to be running in an opposite direction and was the only great AD user that achieved a positive and significant trend of opening cases. Besides this, its yearly growth rate (7.7% p.a.) was the largest among the analyzed countries. Table 2 shows that China was not only the greatest target of AD cases between 1995 and 2012, but was also the only big country to present a positive trend in this aspect. Every year, approximately 1.5 new cases involving this country were added to its high average of almost 35 cases per year. Although we have verified an overall downward trend of almost 2.4% per year, this does not appear to occur with China. Actually, the cases against this country rose by approximately 4.4% per year. Similar results were found by McGee (2008) and Bown (2011). The last one revealed that, between 1990 and 2009, China was target of almost 4 times more AD measures than the second country with more cases against it. Among those that have stopped being target of AD measures, United Kingdom, Poland, Spain, France, Italy and Germany can be highlighted. On average, the number AD cases against products from these countries fell around 5.7% per year. Another relevant result refers to Brazil. It appears that Brazilian products also became less recurring targets of AD (decrease of almost 3.6% p.a.). Thus, it is curious to notice that its AD use is rising (Table 1), in spite of the reduction of cases opened against Brazil (Table 2). According to Moreira and Ornelas (2008), Brazil has gotten a good performance on the last dispute settlements of WTO (with favorable results in many disputes). Therefore, it could encourage the use of AD by this country. However, the end of 2001–2002 recession and the liberalizing ideas proposed at Doha Round seem to have been efficient to decrease the number of AD cases in other WTO\'s countries (Bown, 2011). Thus, the reduction of AD cases, against Brazil, can be just following the general trend of WTO members.